'BLITZSCALING'?

The Changing Structure of UK Venture Capital

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THE SECOND GREAT TECH BOOM (1)..



Major firms account for 10-15% total value and half of the tech sector portion. (This boom is more concentrated than the 1990s.)

THE SECOND GREAT TECH BOOM (2)..

Figure 1



Evolution of the US Venture Capital Industry from 1985-2019

Investment into new firms via venture capital. Via Lerner and Nanda (2020) JEP

The UK received more investment than Germany and France combined, and about one third of total investment in Europe in 2019.



Page / 5 January 2020 | Check underlying data via https://datacommons.technation.io

TECH NATION dealroom.CO

...WITH THE UK LEADING EUROPE.

In Europe, the UK ranks #1 by number of unicorns.



Prominent unicorn case is based on an investment hypothesis about fast-scaling firms..

'Blitzscaling is a strategy for driving and managing extremely rapid growth that prioritizes speed over efficiency in an environment of uncertainty.'



'It requires hypergrowth but goes beyond the blunt strategy of 'get big fast' because it **involves purposefully and intentionally doing things that don't make sense** according to traditional business thinking'.

GOOGLE TRENDS - BLITZSCALING



Widespread perception that cloud services and mobile computing have had strong effects:

Some personal history helps answer the first question. When I launched a startup in 2000, my one and only institutional funding round of \$15 million was largely consumed by the need to buy and maintain servers and storage devices, to write highly customized code for every business process, and to build market awareness through expensive, inefficient mass marketing channels. Launching that same venture today would probably cost 90 percent less, thanks to modern enabling technologies: open source computing, rapid wireframe and prototyping tools contract manufacturing, fulfillment-as-a-service, web-store design, cost-effective social media customer targeting, and cloud-based services.

Leonard Sherman, Wired 2019

- A hypothesis that recent technological changes have lowered the fixed costs of basic firm investments as well as the costs of distribution.
- Specifically, cloud services (fixed costs) and mobile computing (distribution) have been the underpinnings. See Ewens, Nanda, and Rhodes-Kropf(2018) on AWS. Subsequent rise of 'software-as-a-service' sector.
- The banner examples are AirBnb and Uber. The 'blitzscaling plus' version also features network effects + gaining monopoly power in new markets.

BLITZSCALING SCEPTICS!



BUSINESS 87.11.2019 89:80 AM

$\ _{\rm a}$ 'Blitzscaling' Is Choking Innovation—and Wasting Money

SIG

Opinion: VCs are making bigger bets on fewer startups. It's this unconsidered, money-slinging strategy that led to Uber's and Lyft's dud IPOs.

This is problematic to the extent that venture capital allocation decisions are driven more by the VCs' urgency to deploy capital than by real business needs. In a world awash in capital from sovereign wealth funds, deep-pocketed Asian investors, and other highly endowed institutions, VC's have increasingly embraced the philosophy of "<u>blitzscaling</u>." in which investing unprecedented amounts of capital is believed to convey winner-take-all (or most) competitive advantage.

For example, when on-demand dog-walking service Wag sought to raise a \$100 million D-round from a syndicate of US VCs in 2017, the Japanese based Softbank Vision Fund swept in with a preemptive solo investment of \$300 million, quadrupling Wag's market value just nine months after i prior funding round.

It wasn't clear then or now that a dog-walking service warrants an investment or valuation on this scale. Likewise, the business strategy wasn't apparent last year when Softbank led a <u>\$240 million C-round investment</u> in direct-to-consumer company Brandless, which has <u>subsequently struggled</u> to scale.

- How have investments patterns changed? Sectoral composition and distinction between first and later rounds.
- What were the impacts of the 2000s AWS cloud revolution? Use text information to assess the extent of technological and product market change.
- Performance: Is the 'experimentation function' of VC changing? What evidence is there on success rates?

- Boom in 'business intelligence' data for VC activities: Crunchbase, Pitchbook, CB Insights, Parsers VC and UK specialist Beauhurst.
- Beauhurst covers 'high-growth' firms who hit at least one of 8 triggers.
- The tracking involves a comprehensive, cleaned up profile of the firm..

'Any possibly interesting new standalone firm'.

- · Secured equity investment.
- · Secured venture debt.
- Underwent a management buyout or buy-in.
- Attended a selected accelerator programme.
- Has been or is a scaleup.
- Spun out of an academic institution.
- Was featured in a selected high-growth list.
- Accepted a large innovation grant.

GRAPHCORE - AI CHIP PRODUCER



We take two main steps to make Companies House (CH) usable for the analysis of start-ups:

- **Start-ups:** Define the universe of new 'standalone' firms that can be classified as start-ups. This gives us a panel of start-up firms by their year of first incorporation or 'birth'.
- **Reporting Rules**: We clarify the rules for accounts reporting such that we're able to model sales and employment growth. In short, firms must report account above a certain level (hence the distribution of variables like sales or employment is left-censored.)

Ideal would be admin data but this is the 'actually existing and accessible' version.



UK data allows us to observe the 'top tail' of high growth firms.

- The first point-of-entry is the fact that funding occurs across rounds.
- Unlike (say) pension portfolio investment, VC investment is premised on collecting info across rounds of investment & providing input into the investment.
- It therefore provides a window into the economics of business experimentation...

FUNDING ACROSS ROUNDS



- Probability of second round conditional on first = 54.3%.
- Rises to 74.7% for PE-VC deals.

'Experimentation' - First-to-Second Round Funding.



• Probability mass at big hits and big misses.

Aggregate Funding by Sector and Round



- Heavy bias of VC funding towards software.
- This is then concentrated in subsequent rounds.

| - | Deals | Mega | Giga | Mega share | Giga share | Mean deal (£m) | Median deal (£m) |
|-------------|-------|------|------|------------|------------|----------------|------------------|
| Software | | | | | | | |
| All rounds | 2,254 | 33 | 14 | 1.5% | 0.6% | 5.45 | 1.72 |
| First round | 632 | 6 | 4 | 0.9% | 0.6% | 2.92 | 0.53 |
| Subsequent | 1,622 | 27 | 10 | 1.7% | 0.6% | 6.43 | 2.30 |
| Other | | | | | | | |
| All rounds | 2,105 | 41 | 14 | 1.9% | 0.7% | 6.38 | 2.00 |
| First round | 817 | 11 | 5 | 1.3% | 0.6% | 5.79 | 1.67 |
| Subsequent | 1,288 | 30 | 9 | 2.3% | 0.7% | 6.75 | 2.20 |

• Big median vs mean split shows importance of growing number of large deals.

• Mega = /£50+ million; Giga = /£100+ million

RISE OF THE MEGA-DEALS



• 13 mega-deals (amount to £1.3 bil in total) accounted for approx 37% of VC funding by 2019.

| | Software | | | | Other | | | |
|--------------------------------------|----------|-------|--------|------|-------|------|--------|------|
| | mean | p50 | sd | Ν | mean | p50 | sd | Ν |
| Firm age at deal date in years | 4.47 | 3.37 | 4.18 | 2174 | 6.96 | 4.50 | 8.71 | 2030 |
| HQ region is London | 0.66 | 1.00 | 0.47 | 2252 | 0.35 | 0.00 | 0.48 | 2097 |
| Acquired? | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.30 | 2254 | 0.11 | 0.00 | 0.31 | 2105 |
| IPOd? | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 2254 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.15 | 2105 |
| Failure (dead/zombie) | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.29 | 2254 | 0.11 | 0.00 | 0.32 | 2105 |
| Latest pre money valuation millions | 51.30 | 8.59 | 198.99 | 2102 | 29.09 | 6.55 | 108.21 | 1738 |
| Latest post money valuation millions | 57.22 | 11.17 | 210.58 | 2102 | 34.07 | 8.30 | 115.50 | 1738 |
| Firm received large innovation grant | 0.14 | 0.00 | 0.35 | 2254 | 0.27 | 0.00 | 0.45 | 2105 |
| Firm has Patent | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.23 | 2254 | 0.17 | 0.00 | 0.37 | 2105 |
| Firm has Trademark | 0.50 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 2254 | 0.51 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 2105 |

- 10% acquired, 1% IPO, 9% failure.
- Strong presence of 'knowledge capital' (trademarks, patents, innovation grants).

| Dependent variable: Ln(fundraising) | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | | Se | ed | | | Later | stages | |
| Year | 0.117*** | 0.094*** | 0.138*** | 0.136*** | 0.072*** | 0.035** | 0.062*** | 0.064*** |
| | (0.018) | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.011) | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.015) |
| Software | -0.272*** | -0.502*** | -1.071*** | -1.084*** | -0.081 | -0.449*** | -0.634*** | -0.648*** |
| | (0.085) | (0.193) | (0.215) | (0.214) | (0.065) | (0.122) | (0.130) | (0.125) |
| Software X Year | | 0.046 | 0.047 | 0.047 | | 0.076*** | 0.069*** | 0.070*** |
| | | (0.035) | (0.033) | (0.033) | | (0.023) | (0.021) | (0.020) |
| Observations | 1356 | 1356 | 1354 | 1354 | 3003 | 3003 | 2995 | 2995 |
| Number of clusters | 1178 | 1178 | 1176 | 1176 | 2033 | 2033 | 2030 | 2030 |
| Firm Controls | no | no | yes | yes | no | no | yes | yes |
| Investor Controls | no | no | no | yes | no | no | no | yes |

- Firm controls include BH high level sectors, age and turnover bands, tracking reasons and HQ in London. Investor controls: announced, and type (angel/crowd/government/undisclosed).
- Evolution of 'spray and pray' into 'spray, pray and go very big'.

- The rise of AWS in the 2000s led to falling start-up costs and a 'spray-and-pay' approach by investors (Ewens, Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2018)).
- Has the cloud revolution enhanced the diversity of digital start-ups? Have new sub-sectors emerged?
- We use the text info in Beauhurst to endogenously classify firms.

Basic approach is:

- Preprocess the text. Construct a W-vector for each firm of the word frequencies V_i.
- Then calculate cosine similarities across firm (*i*, *j*) pairs. This boils down to a correlation measure for text.
- Run a clustering algorithm on the $(N \times N)$ firm matrix. To put similar firms into discrete bins. This creates a branching structure...



Basic branching structure of the clusters. We can look at the correspondence with SIC...

- TNI is like an SIC classification determined endogenously by the text data.
- It can get at 'fractal' groupings of firms that don't necessarily match the SIC taxonomy (but have explanatory power).
- We can therefore see the spread of endogenous sectors according to traditionally-defined industries...



• Breaking this down, shows that there were clear 'waves of entry' by new types of firms in the 2010s...



Top companies by latest valuations:

- Platform: The Hut Group, Darktrace, TransferWise, Funding Circle, WorldRemit
- · Al: BenevolentAl, Metaswitch, NewVoiceMedia, Luminance, what3words
- Mobile apps: Revolut, Monzo, Shazam, Truphone, Receipt Bank
- Wider apps:SyntheticGestalt, Improbable, Graphcore, Snyk, ClearBank
- · Services integration: Deliveroo, Wonga, OneFirewall Alliance, Unily, Tantalum
- · Others: wejo,Skyscanner, Displaydata, Veeva,onefinestay

- This is hard to evaluate. By definition, the investments from the mid-to-late 2010s have not had time to mature.
- A foregrounding approach is to look at 'extreme success' in terms of sales growth using our historical Companies House start-up database.
- Let's us ask: how does the digital sector stack up as a general predictor of extreme success?



| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|--------------|--------------|------------|
| VARIABLES | То | p 10% firm b | y log(revenu | es)? |
| 0 | | 0.00004+++ | 0.0044*** | |
| Own trademark? | | 0.0882*** | 0.0811*** | |
| | | (0.0207) | (0.0156) | |
| Own patent? | | 0.0252*** | 0.0220*** | |
| | | (0.00522) | (0.00430) | |
| Received grant? | | 0.00700* | 0.00728** | |
| | | (0.00385) | (0.00319) | |
| Any IP capability? | 0.0571*** | | | 0.0592*** |
| | (0.0112) | | | (0.00962) |
| Any IP capability*Digital sectors | | | | -0.0357*** |
| | | | | (0.0107) |
| Observations | 2,040,114 | 2,040,114 | 2,040,106 | 2,040,106 |
| R-squared | 0.006 | 0.007 | 0.042 | 0.041 |
| Birth year FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| SIC4 FE | Ν | Ν | Y | Y |

Table 1: Probability of extreme success

Standard errors clustered by SIC4 in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.



| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--------------|-----------|--------------|---------------|-----------------|
| | Follow On | Step1 Change | Number Rounds | Successful Exit |
| | | | | |
| softwaresaas | 0.084*** | -0.471*** | 0.391*** | 0.007 |
| | (0.020) | (0.140) | (0.118) | (0.009) |
| Ν | 3,099 | 2,424 | 3,099 | 3,099 |

- Software investment has a longer investment life-cycle.
- The big bets accumulate across later rounds. Successful exit is just hard to judge at this stage.

- Areas with longer time horizons and more complex investment requirements (eg: clean teach) have benefited less from the VC investment boom. Generally, policy-makers should recognise that *failure is the norm*.
- Lots of experimentation should be a good thing. 'Hot money' environments are good for turning up unexpected ideas (Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf 2017)
- But 'blitzscaling' investment strategy must be monitored. There'll be lots to learn about the 'experimentation function' from this era.

Aggregate Funding by Sector and Stage of evolution



- Heavy bias of VC funding towards software.
- This is then concentrated in later (growth) stages of evolution of the business.

| Dependent variable: Ln(fundraising) | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | | First F | Round | | | Subsequ | ent Round | |
| Year | 0.023 | -0.025 | 0.030 | 0.034 | 0.059*** | 0.016 | 0.083*** | 0.082*** |
| | (0.018) | (0.024) | (0.023) | (0.022) | (0.013) | (0.019) | (0.017) | (0.017) |
| Software | -0.743*** | -1.247*** | -1.304*** | -1.265*** | 0.003 | -0.402*** | -0.486*** | -0.522*** |
| | (0.088) | (0.174) | (0.193) | (0.190) | (0.074) | (0.151) | (0.147) | (0.146) |
| Software X Year | | 0.115*** | 0.098*** | 0.096*** | | 0.079*** | 0.050** | 0.055** |
| | | (0.035) | (0.032) | (0.032) | | (0.026) | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Observations | 1449 | 1449 | 1447 | 1447 | 2910 | 2910 | 2902 | 2902 |
| Number of clusters | 1449 | 1449 | 1447 | 1447 | 1886 | 1886 | 1882 | 1882 |
| Firm Controls | no | no | yes | yes | no | no | yes | yes |
| Investor Controls | no | no | no | yes | no | no | no | yes |

- Firm controls include BH high level sectors, age and turnover bands, tracking reasons and dummy for HQ in London
- Investor controls include a dummy for whether the deal was announced, and dummies for whether the deal involves angel/crowd/government/undisclosed investors